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Abstract:
Over the past ten years, there have been several high-profile accidents in academic labs around the
world resulting in significant injuries and fatalities. The aftermath of these incidents is often
characterized by calls for reflection and reexamination of the academic discipline’s approach to
safety research and policy. However, the study of academic lab safety is still underdeveloped and
necessary data about changes in safety attitudes and behaviours has not been gathered. This
Review article critically examines the state of academic chemical safety research from a
multifactorial stance, including research on the occurrence of lab accidents, contributors to lab
accidents, the state of safety training research, and the cultural barriers to conducting safety
research and implementing safer lab practices. The article concludes by delineating research
questions that must be addressed to minimize future serious academic laboratory incidents as well
as stressing the need for committed leadership from our research institutions.
----------------------On December 29, 2008, Ms Sheharbano Sangji, a research assistant in the lab of Dr Patrick Harran
at UCLA, was working with a large quantity of tert-butyllithium when the pyrophoric chemical
spilled and ignited her clothing leading to 2nd and 3rd degree burns over 40% of her body. The
23-year-old died in hospital three weeks later.1
Contributing factors to this accident can be identified at multiple levels: the individual, the
laboratory, the department, the institution and the discipline itself.1 At the time of the accident,
Sangji was not wearing a lab coat1 and was not following the manufacturer’s safety protocols for
handling large quantities of a pyrophoric chemical (for example, the reagent bottle was not
clamped and a plastic syringe was used instead of glass).2 Despite knowing that she had limited
experience working independently in chemistry labs, Harran, her supervisor, stated that he had not
trained Sangji in the proper handling of pyrophorics and that the necessary technical guidelines
were not readily available in the lab.1 A post-doctoral researcher in the Harran group who recalled
that he may have offered general guidance to Sangji about the transfer and handling of tertbutyllithium acknowledged that he did not follow the manufacturer’s safety instructions for
handling this reagent and did not believe he had ever read them.1,3
It is not clear that a lab coat was actually ordered for Sangji by Harran or anyone else at UCLA.1
In fact, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) was not officially mandated by university

policy.1 Pending completion of renovations to laboratory space on another floor, Harran had been
given temporary space that was 30-40% smaller than his requirements and did not have a
stockroom for storing chemicals.1 In the 14 months prior to Sangji’s death, UCLA had failed to
report to the California Division of Occupational Health and Safety two other similar, but nonfatal, incidents from other research groups involving burns and facial lacerations to students not
wearing appropriate PPE.1,4,5 Although experienced researchers will criticize the technique
employed for the pyrophoric chemical, an individual who has not been trained in their use cannot
be faulted: in virtually all published research where tert-butyllithium is used, the hazards of
working with this chemical are rarely spelled out.6
In 2012, Dr Neal Langerman, former chair of the Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the
American Chemical Society (ACS), described the UCLA incident as, “The most serious challenge
to the practice of laboratory safety in many years. The lessons learned should result in fundamental
cultural changes in the approach to research safety.”7 Yet despite the occurrence of this tragedy
and other serious high-profile incidents in the intervening years (for example, the death of Ms
Michele Dufault at Yale University, and explosions causing significant injuries to Mr Preston
Brown at Texas Tech and Dr Thea Ekins-Coward at the University of Hawaii),8-11 the field of
academic lab safety has received little empirical attention, and research efforts in this area have
been fragmentary.12
In many cases, questionable research methodologies seriously undermine the reliability, validity
and applicability of findings. As a result, policies and procedures around safety are developed in a
reactionary, ad hoc patchwork rather than on a solid, comprehensive, empirical foundation.13 More
than ten years on from Sangji’s death, we can conclude that there is no evidence of sweeping,
fundamental changes nor of major paradigm shifts in how academic lab safety is approached
within the discipline. As this was a high-profile case, and was initially expected to be a turning
point for academic lab safety, we will return to this example for illustrative purposes. However,
we want to emphasize that safety is not a problem unique to the Harran laboratory or to UCLA:
the failures that led to the death of Sangji are systemic and could have occurred in many research
groups at many institutions. The problem is, and sadly remains, much bigger than a single case.14
This Review aims to critically examine the current state of chemistry laboratory safety research,
to discuss the barriers to conducting and implementing results of this research, and to call for a reexamination of, and a commitment to, academic chemistry’s role in accident research and
prevention.
Type and frequency of accidents in the academic setting
All practicing chemists in academic institutions are aware of and acknowledge that lab accidents
and near-misses (for example, fires, leaks, glassware implosions or explosions, spills, equipment
or instrument misuse resulting in equipment failure that do not result in injury) occur regularly.15,16
However, to the best of our knowledge, no researcher, university, regulatory body or professional
organization has collated the annual incidence of academic laboratory accidents. No
comprehensive dataset is currently available on the type or frequency of accidents or near-misses
in academic laboratories.5,17 Although several researchers have attempted to create accident
databases,15 participation in these initiatives is voluntary meaning that these sources are incomplete

and inadequate for the purposes of research and comprehensive policy development. This lack of
data severely hampers any efforts to understand accidents, to take steps to prevent them, to reduce
their frequency and severity or to create evidence-based safety guidelines.
It could be expected that gathering, collating and analyzing lab accident data in order to determine
prevalence rate might fall under the purview of governmental regulatory agencies. However, to
our knowledge, neither the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the United
States nor any of the 13 provincial and territorial safety boards in Canada, despite receiving
accident reports and carrying out investigations, has ever compiled or analyzed this data as a
whole. In addition, OSHA regulations do not apply to all universities or to all lab personnel
working in a university, depending on their employment status. Since 2001, the US Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) has reported 120 academic research laboratory
accidents resulting in 87 evacuations, 96 serious injuries and three deaths (Table 1).18 However,
these represent only those accidents that universities have been required to report due to the
severity of the consequences. Regulators may thus remain unaware of potentially major incidents
or significant near-misses if no one was seriously injured.19
There has been very little academic research into the prevalence and incidence of laboratory
accidents. In the only study we could find using a proper multi-institutional epidemiological
approach, Hellman, Savage and Keefe, examining 574 accidents occurring at 13 Colorado
institutions between 1966 and 1984, found that 81% of accidents occurred in teaching labs, 13%
in research labs and 2% in fabrication rooms.20 Most accidents occurred in entry-level chemistry
lab courses or organic lab courses, and most commonly-occurred among younger individuals.20
There have been a few, mostly small, studies focused specifically on the prevalence of research
lab-related injuries. In one survey from Nature and UCLA of 2,400 scientists, 30% reported having
witnessed a lab injury severe enough to warrant attention from a medical professional.21 A small
pilot study of 56 lab personnel in Canadian chemistry and biology labs revealed that 15% of those
surveyed had sustained at least one injury.22 Simmons, Matos and Simpson found that lab
accidents, both in teaching and research labs, represented 18.4% of the total incidents reported at
Iowa State university from 2001-2014 and that student employees were the victims in one third of
injury reports.23
Aside from the study by Hellman and colleagues, there have been few studies of injuries sustained
in undergraduate teaching laboratories, perhaps because these situations are more carefully
controlled and involve less dangerous reagents. However, one study of students enrolled in general
chemistry and organic chemistry courses found that 12% sustained an injury, the most common
ones being chemical burns, inhalation of irritating or toxic gases and cuts.24
Although this research is incomplete, it certainly paints a troubling picture. One major issue is that
research into laboratory injuries tells us nothing about the overall accident prevalence rate. 'Close
calls' involving no injuries are anecdotally far more common than accidents involving injuries, but
are rarely even reported unless the property damage is severe. In addition, the true accident
prevalence rate is likely worse than these results suggest as there is some evidence to suggest that
underreporting is a significant problem in science. Studies conducted in this area have shown that

25-38% of participating lab personnel have been involved in an accident or injury in the lab that
was not reported to the supervisor/principal investigator (PI).23-25
Contributing factors in laboratory accidents
Given the lack of research on the prevalence and incidence rates of academic lab accidents, it is
perhaps not surprising that there is a similar lack of research on what causes lab accidents.
Contributing factors to lab accidents can be conceptualized as occurring at multiple levels: risks
associated with the materials or equipment being used, risks related to the skills, knowledge and
choices of the research personnel doing the study, characteristics or qualities of the PI and the
research lab in which the research is occurring and risk factors arising from the departmental or
institutional level.
Risks associated with the materials being used have received the most attention in the laboratory
health and safety literature. For example, there have been publications about specific reagents such
as diazomethane, organolithiums or dimethyl dioxirane;26-29 these reports are usually presented in
the context of why a new methodology is safer or more effective. Discussions on particular
reagents are mostly found only in the blogosphere,30,31 or in ever-growing compendia of
reagents.32-34 However, safety information about reagents is not typically required by journals in
the discipline. Grabowski and Goode found that only 8% of the 726 chemistry journals they
identified required safety factors to be mentioned in the manuscript.6 The authors specifically
looked at mentions of 11 target compounds that are known to be hazardous (including tertbutyllithium); these compounds were mentioned 107 times but only one article provided
cautionary information.
If institutions are not providing comprehensive safety training on the use of reagents, which seems
to be the case (see below), it becomes untenable for authors to assume that readers will be aware
of the risks associated with particular compounds. This assumption becomes increasingly
dangerous as more and more chemistry research is conducted around the world by inexperienced
students and trainees. Starting in 2017, the ACS has mandated that all experimental publications
provide warnings for current or new hazards or risks.35 However, this recommendation was
tempered by the use of the phrase 'as appropriate', meaning that the inclusion of safety information
is at the discretion of the authors and reviewers. A follow-up to the work of Grabowski and Grave
would be informative as to whether the change in policy has changed the content of articles or has
been enforced by the journals.
We could not find any studies anywhere that looked at how skills, knowledge, experience or
attitudes of the research personnel are associated with the occurrence of lab accidents or other
proxy variables (for example, near-misses). Similarly, there have been no studies investigating the
occurrence and recurrence of accidents within specific departments or universities, nor has there
been research looking at the role of situational factors in causing accidents, such as time of day
(for example, late at night). The most complete research to date on the causes of academic lab
accidents comes from the previously mentioned epidemiological study of Colorado chemistry
departments for incidents occurring between 1966 and 1984.20 Hellman, Savage and Keefe
examined demographic characteristics of victims, details about research activities, type/location
of injury, time of day, and time of year for 574 accidents. The value of this data to the contemporary

research laboratory is questionable. Most incidents occurred during undergraduate teaching labs
and many involved now-obsolete techniques (for example, mouth-pipetting).
There are also a number of historically-based factors that limit the current applicability of the
results: the majority of accidents happened during afternoons in the academic year, likely because
this was when those universities offered undergraduate labs; and most injuries were to men,
primarily because a much greater proportion of the undergraduate student population at that time
were men. However, the study’s authors highlight the contribution of human factors to lab
accidents and call for additional research, saying “Of all the variables in accident prevention, the
human behavior variable, even with education, was the hardest to control.”36,37 The study has never
been replicated or updated since it was published and, we note with dismay, has only been cited 7
times according to independent Web of Science, Scifinder, and Google Scholar searches conducted
on April 5, 2019.
Case studies have been published in response to significant incidents and have typically resulted
in the creation of reaction- and equipment-specific guidelines. For example, case studies have been
published about Sangji’s death,38 the explosion at Texas Tech,11 a gas leak at the National
University of Singapore,39 the mishandling of a drum of radioactive material,40 and a sucrose-acid
explosion at an unnamed university.41 These case studies often take a comprehensive look at the
multifactorial contributors to the accident at the individual, laboratory and institutional levels.
However, this multi-level approach is not characteristic of safety research in general nor of the
implementation of safety policies in chemistry departments, though it should be. Researchers in
the wider field of occupational safety have suggested that accidents are most likely to occur when
multiple individual and system failures align (that is, the 'Swiss cheese' model of accidents).42
These case studies and reagent-specific studies have not led to more comprehensive research, a
deeper conversation across the academic discipline or a broader examination of accident causes
despite explicit calls to do so. Fundamentally, case studies represent a collection of anecdotes 43,
which may be informative and useful in specific situations and with specific materials, but
represent an insufficient basis for the creation of wider evidence-based safety policies and
procedures. Case studies play a valuable role in building the evidence base but they are usually
intended to be the launching point for broader analysis, not the end-point as they have been to-date
in the world of academic lab safety. In fact, the bulk of these publications appeared in the Journal
of Chemical Health & Safety, which is not completely indexed in SciFinder, despite being a
flagship publication associated with a division of the ACS. Such considerations make this work
difficult to find even for those scientists who actively seek it.
Attitudes about safety and behavioural practices
There has been some research on the attitudes and beliefs of lab personnel regarding safety in the
lab. For the most part, these studies tend to suggest that researchers have generally positive views
towards the concept of lab safety and related concepts. Wu and colleagues in Taiwan assessed
perceptions of safety leadership in 465 lab employees; respondents rated levels of 'safety coaching',
'safety caring' and 'safety controlling' at their institution quite highly.44 In a study of 85 staff, faculty
and grad students, Steward, Wilson and Wang found generally positive attitudes about safety
culture in the lab, that is, employees’ perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and safety.45 A

large majority of participants in Ayi and Hon’s study (88%) described safety as a high priority in
their labs. Schröder and co-workers found that over 90% of researchers felt that their labs were a
safe place to work.46 Although these studies are encouraging and potentially relevant to the
occurrence of lab accidents, the role of abstract ideas such as safety culture, safety climate, safety
leadership, safety coaching, and subjective feelings of safety is of limited utility without these
constructs being validated against objective measures such as frequency of accidents and injuries,
or even of proxy measures such as inspection violations. In other words, it is not clear if individuals
who value safety and believe that their workplaces are safe actually make safe choices in their
laboratory practices. To date, there has been no research on the correlations between safety
attitudes and safety practices.
In contrast to these optimistic findings about safety beliefs, research results regarding behavioural
safety practices are concerning. The results from several studies have suggested that researchers
are disinclined to conduct safety assessments prior to conducting experiments. In Ayi and Hon’s
study, 27% of participants, active experimental researchers, stated that they never conducted any
kind of risk assessment before performing laboratory work.22 In another study, half of respondents
did not search for, or use, safety information in developing experimental procedures, yet 80%
considered the existing available information adequate to support risk assessment (suggesting that
participants generally thought the information to be sufficient but were disinclined to use it for
other, unidentified reasons).47 In Schröder and co-workers' comparison of researchers in different
settings, academic researchers were the least likely to assess risk (only 18% reported doing so)
compared to industry (43%) or government (36%).46 To be fair to academia, the low rate of risk
assessment identified in this study by researchers in industry and government is also troubling.
There have also been a few studies on the use of PPE, and again, the results are difficult to interpret
given that the general positive attitudes towards safety shown in these studies. In a study of
undergraduates in teaching labs (arguably, the easiest cohort to observe and control), Sieloff and
coauthors found that 94% of students consistently reported wearing eye protection but 65% said
they never wore gloves.24 These findings are similar to those of Ayi and Hon, who found that only
40% of their participants, academic researchers, reported wearing PPE at all times when working.22
Schröder and colleagues found that researchers in academia were less likely to wear lab coats (66%
consistently wore them) or eye protection (61%) than industry (87% and 83% respectively) or
government employees (73% and 76%).46 Again, these numbers are a cause for concern.
From a methodological standpoint, the exclusive use of self-report data in these studies is troubling
as results are likely to be inaccurate due to social desirability bias in participants’ responses (that
is, the tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed favourably by
others),48 a factor that has not been acknowledged or addressed in any of this research.49 For
example, researchers know that they should be wearing PPE and may therefore intentionally or
unintentionally inflate the numbers they report in studies; a more accurate estimate of PPE usage,
which could be gathered through observational studies (but so far has not), may be much worse.
However, without proper data, we cannot say with any certainty how the use of PPE relates to
accident frequency and/or severity. It may be the case that the semblance of protection can
encourage riskier behaviour. For example, research has shown that the use of bicycle helmets is
correlated with increased risk of accident,50 consumers tend to make higher-calorie choices when
provided with calorie counts at restaurants51 and beachgoers often choose to swim outside of

designated safe areas on beaches.52 The use of PPE might encourage researchers to take more or
greater risks and therefore increase the rate or severity of lab accidents. These are the types of
questions that should be addressed by researchers of academic lab safety.
Commentators on academic lab safety have noted the role of human factors and commented on
their importance in safety behaviours.53 Some have even labelled the cognitive biases at play in
safety issues or made safety recommendations based on psychological principles of habit
development.54 Hendershot expressed concern at researchers’ tendencies to believe that activities
must be safe if they are done routinely and nothing has gone wrong, thus ignoring the base rates
of accidents.37 He cautioned, “Our personal experience in a few thousand work hours is not
statistically relevant when actual performance of the process industries is in the range of a few
fatalities in hundreds of millions of exposure hours.” Human factors have frequently been cited in
the write-ups of incident case studies. For example, Schmidt mentioned the bystander effect (that
is, the tendency of individuals to offload responsibility for intervening in a critical situation when
others are present55) in describing the circumstances that led to a gas leak at a research institute in
Singapore.39 The results from several studies suggest that many research personnel see the level
of risk in their laboratories as low. For example, 59% of participants in Ayi and Hon’s study
thought that the level of risk associated with their work was low or very low.22 It would also appear
that decision-making with regards to PPE is heavily based on respondents’ own assessment of risk:
at higher levels of (self-assessed) risk, respondents in Schröder’s study said they were more likely
to don the appropriate PPE.
Given the likely impact of individual biases, ensuring perfect access to information and training
(for example, Bretherick’s handbook, ACS guidelines, departmental policies, laboratory policies)
and making equipment available is not likely to change outcomes without a better understanding
of the psychology of safety decision-making.47,56 These resources are currently available to many
researchers and are not being used. Behavioural data must be collected to inform new practices in
training. The relationship between perception of risk and safety attitudes and behaviour needs to
be studied and addressed. However, to date, the champions for safety have been natural scientists
and engineers whose research expertise is not in social science methodology and who may be
unfamiliar with important and relevant psychological constructs (such as social desirability in
responding). The studies examined for this Review article, as noted throughout, suffer from flaws
that compromise the validity, reliability and generalizability of their findings where policy is
concerned.
More often than not, the consideration of human factors has tended to centre on blaming victims
for their behaviours that led to or aggravated an accident, exemplified in the case of Sangji57.
Though many write-ups focused on the fact that she did not think to use the lab shower when her
shirt caught fire, in fact, neither of the two postdocs who assisted her in the aftermath of the
incident thought to do so either;1 the tendency of individuals to respond inappropriately in the face
of a medical emergency is a well-documented phenomenon but this has not been accounted for in
the development of laboratory safety policies.58,59 Or, as Hill and Finster put it, “It’s easy to blame
the individual and not consider why the person acted in this way.”60 This attitude seems to be
widespread across the profession. In their study of the contributing factors to lab accidents,
Hellman and co-workers interviewed chemistry educators, who reported that most accidents
happen because students are careless and do not listen to instructions.20 The tendency towards

victim-blaming has often led to a perception of post-incident investigations as punitive rather than
learning experiences,40 thus increasing negative attitudes towards safety policies and procedures,
poisoning the attitudes of generations of students, and increasing the under-reporting rate.
Safety training research
Attitudes and beliefs about lab safety may be shaped as early as during undergraduate study, or
even earlier,61 and there have been numerous calls for safety training to be incorporated into the
undergraduate curriculum in a more meaningful way.13,62-64 Consequently, there is slightly more
research on safety training for undergraduate students enrolled in teaching labs compared to
research labs.62,65-75
Several studies have looked at program-wide safety initiatives that incorporated a variety of
strategies. Many of these published studies have been done at small primarily undergraduate
institutions (PUIs) rather than at large research-focused schools, although there are a few notable
exceptions.15,74,76,77 Common elements to these programs include handouts, didactics, the creation
of safety databases, self-study programs, laboratory exams and quizzes, use of safety contracts and
the creation of safety-focused courses at some universities.64,66-68,74,78 Other researchers have
looked at the use of more specific strategies for enhancing safety, including safety planning
documents,79 black lights to demonstrate issues of lab cleanliness,72 scavenger hunts as a training
strategy,65 student safety teams,73 and personalized safety videos.69 Others have made comparisons
between online and in-person safety training programs.62 Shariff and Norazahar had students report
on their peers’ safety behaviours and found a reduction in all of the issues researchers identified
(for example, use of PPE, keeping work spaces clean, horseplay) over the study time period,80 with
the exception of cell phone use.
Research on the safety beliefs and practices of undergraduate students is important. Our concern
is that many undergraduates quickly learn to see safety training as an institutionally-mandated
hassle. The risks are often minimal by design, and the information is provided out of context and
can appear to be overly restrictive and possibly silly. This negative attitude towards lab safety may
be of little consequence in undergraduate teaching labs that are carefully controlled and involve
few hazardous reagents. However, should these students continue on to graduate school and further
work in academic research labs, a casual disregard towards safety may be a much greater liability
when they are working with more dangerous reagents and processes. First impressions are
extremely important and can cement attitudes and approaches early.
Unfortunately, much of the existing research on safety training in undergraduates is of
questionable validity with regards to evidence-based policy-making on a wider scale or outside of
the setting in which the data was gathered. These studies rarely include control groups or
randomization to the intervention to ensure that observed changes are due to the program alone
and not to other factors. Studies also typically examine the combined effect of several initiatives
simultaneously making it impossible, if there is any measurable change, to disentangle the
causative contribution of the interventions. These studies generally do not include pre-and postmeasures to assess the efficacy of the program. Because they lack this behavioural follow-up, it is
unclear which safety training interventions lead to increased knowledge, better retention, increased
compliance with safety rules, a decreased rate of incidents or better results in laboratory safety

inspections. The one study that did look at the effects of specific intervention sessions found
increases in (self-reported) safety knowledge, safety perception and safety attitude, but crucially,
no corresponding increase in safety behaviour.71
The safety programs are usually implemented only at one institution, meaning that it is unclear
whether these initiatives would be feasible or applicable elsewhere, and the research is conducted
by those who established the safety protocols, making results susceptible to bias. Our intention in
critiquing the methodology of these studies is not to throw the metaphorical baby out with the
bathwater. The efforts of these researchers who have taken time out of their primary research
program to investigate these issues are laudable, and we would not expect professors whose
primary expertise is in the natural sciences to have a detailed knowledge of psychological or
pedagogical research methods. Our point is rather that collaboration with social scientists may be
the key to building and improving on this area of the research literature and that methodological
errors can be readily addressed in the study design with no more effort on the part of the
researchers. At the same time, social scientists, who are not experts in the materials and processes
employed in the laboratory setting, need to work with the natural scientists to design the studies
and the interventions. This research, by its very nature, requires an interdisciplinary approach.
There have been far fewer studies about implementing safety improvements in academic research
labs. Some papers have been published on how to perform safety investigations,81 how to learn
from close-calls,82,83 and how to design hazard-analysis systems84 all indicating that these basic
practices are not universally implemented. Others have reported on risk reduction strategies
including systematic approaches to safety management and risk assessment,84 the use of facility
login software,85 the creation of a chemical safety library,86 and the creation of a website designed
to share safety information and accident findings.15 A collaboration between the University of
Minnesota and Dow Chemical Company resulted in a safety initiative that included regular lab
tours with reports to PIs and Laboratory Safety Officers (LSOs), the use of posters advertising PPE
usage and Standard Operating Procedure-compliance, regular communication of safety updates
via e-mails and website updates, a 'cleanup' week and training regimen for LSOs.77 Staehle and
colleagues studied the implementation of behavioural strategies in a research lab, including twicedaily inspections by lab members, the use of discussions and quizzes during lab meetings and the
use of an overnight reaction form.76 Huising and Silbey described the 5-year implementation of a
comprehensive management system involving lab inspection teams, the registration of PIs’ labs
on a database and completion of safety training courses.36 Other publications on safety training
have looked at how to train staff,57 including custodial and maintenance workers who work in
laboratories.87
Again, the same methodological issues that plague research on undergraduate safety programs are
also true for academic research labs (for example, lack of control groups and randomization to
interventions, inclusion of several interventions at once, no measurement of objective data such as
accident frequency or inspection violations) and make interpretation and generalizability of results
questionable. We have not been able to locate any studies or articles investigating how PIs train
their research personnel, or on how PIs report that they themselves were trained. This lack of
research with regards to safety training in academic settings means that in most instances, safety
training is a product of institutional memory, anecdotes and, as James Gibson from the Office of
Environment, Health, and Safety at UCLA put it, the 'application and misapplication of common

sense' rather than guided by a standard evidence base.88 Throughout the investigative report on
Sangji’s death at UCLA, it was clear that training was largely conducted through informal
interactions and the passing along of knowledge. Although this is an essential component of
training and knowledge, it should supplement rather than replace the use of formal training,
institutional and laboratory-specific SOPs, protocols and information from manufacturers,
professional societies and compendia of reagents. This informal approach to training is particularly
troubling because the knowledge being passed down may not conform to best practices, as was
clear from the report on Sangji’s death.1
A few studies have been done about perceptions around safety training by academic researchers.
In a survey of 2,400 researchers led by Nature and UCLA, 60% of respondents reported having
received safety training on specific hazards or reagents.21 Schröder and co-authors found that 70%
of researchers in academic settings received safety training, but only 26% were trained within 30
days of starting experiments (the average length of the gap between starting work and receiving
appropriate training was not reported but is certainly worrying).46 This training was usually
conducted by Environmental Health and Safety Officers, with only 35% of participants saying that
they had had additional training from their PI. In a smaller study of 85 participants,22 47% of
participants did not know how often safety inspections were performed in their labs, 35% did not
have access to data or records regarding their lab’s safety and whether or not it complied with
legislated requirements and 9% did not know how to handle an emergency such as a fire or a spill.
Again, an additional concern here is that these results reflect the self-perception of participants
that they could handle a fire or spill, not an objective evaluation of their capacity to do so. Another
study found that 25% of researchers had not been trained in the specific hazard with which they
worked.46 One study showed that only 10% of students, post-doctoral fellows, faculty and staff
felt that their safety training had prepared them to assist others and to intervene when others
engaged in unsafe behaviours.77
Research on safety training, or lack thereof, stands in stark contrast to findings suggesting that
many researchers feel their lab is a safe environment. Although anywhere from 15-30% of
researchers report having been involved in an accident or having sustained an injury, and that a
large percentage also say that they have not received adequate or timely safety training, most
studies have shown that researchers report feeling safe in their labs, perceive the risk level in their
laboratories as low and describe their institution as having a good safety culture. What are we to
make of this discrepancy between objective injury data and subjective feelings of safety? Our
interpretation is that risky practices and a cavalier attitude toward safety are so normalized within
academia that the low standards in the field are not troubling or even apparent to those on the
inside.
Barriers to safety research
Researchers repeatedly state that laboratory safety is important, but knowledge about laboratory
safety has not improved over the past decades.22 Faculty attitudes appear to be one of the main
barriers to change, dating back to the establishment of the first modern academic labs in 1840s.
According to Kekulé, in the 1840s, Liebig welcomed him into his lab as a graduate student by
saying: “If you want to become a chemist…you have to ruin your health. Who does not ruin his
health by his studies, nowadays will not get anywhere in Chemistry.”89 The belief that injuries,

accidents and near-misses are 'just part of the job' remains common and current across the
profession.20,21,90,91 Scherz commented on the element of rebel as scientific hero portrayed in the
autobiographies of some prominent molecular biologists.92 This attitude towards risk has some
corroboration in the research. In a series of interviews conducted with chemistry educators,
participants reported that minor accidents were of no importance.20 The idea of working alone in
the lab at all hours of the day, every day of the year is still considered by some academic
supervisors to be a positive and desirable attitude in trainees.19 (Note: Sangji’s accident occurred
on December 29, during the winter holiday break).
Many commentators have remarked that the most important barrier to the initiation and
implementation of comprehensive safety programming is the attitudes of PIs.16,37,93-97 In the
Nature/UCLA survey of 2,400 researchers, the most commonly-identified barriers to improving
lab safety included 'time and hassle', apathy, lack of understanding of safety requirements, lack of
leadership, and a focus on regulatory compliance.21 Other faculty members have cited a lack of
knowledge, a lack of funding and disagreements about safety policies as reasons for non-adherence
to mandatory policies.90 In one study of lab personnel, barriers to safety improvements included
time and hassle factors, apathy, inadequate training and competing priorities.22 The issue of
'academic freedom' is often raised as an objection to safety practices. One study found that 15% of
researchers believed that safety regulations interfered with productivity, and 23% believed that
they impeded the scientific discovery process.46
The community has made definite efforts to improve policy in the past 10 years. This includes the
ACS’s adoption of safety as a core value, a mandate that safety information be included in journal
articles as appropriate, the appointment of a manager of safety services and an effort to improve
safety education across the educational spectrum. This is laudable, but it is unclear whether these
efforts are making an objective difference. Many of the studies we have cited throughout this
article regarding safety behaviour are all recent and refer to post-UCLA incident practice. Despite
efforts from the ACS and other bodies, it is unclear whether this change in attitude is being
integrated into the practice of academic chemical research, especially when one considers the high
levels of resistance to safety measures observed by Schröder and colleagues in 2016.46
Seemingly negative attitudes towards safety practice may be due to a perception by many scientists
that workplace inspections are focused more on procedures and regulatory compliance than with
a true concern for laboratory safety.46,60,79,88 As Kapin pointed out, “health and safety programs for
laboratories are typically oriented around specific regulatory requirements, even though hazards
in laboratories seldom respect these boundaries.79” Possibly one of the major issues may be the
perception of EHS officers as academic 'interlopers',92 who are not seen by researchers as having
the practical experience necessary to elicit compliance with their recommendations. EHS officers
working at UCLA at the time of Sangji’s accident reported that they were aware of inconsistent
use of PPE in research labs but had no power to impose sanctions or address non-compliance.1
Simply put, the academic discipline does not prioritize safety. Following the UCLA incident,
Langerman made a number of recommendations for how safety issues could be addressed by
students, faculty, laboratory staff, environmental health and safety officers, funding agencies,
professional societies and the ACS.98 His growing exasperation over time was obvious to
readers,7,98,99 and he recommended ensuring the compliance of recalcitrant PIs by taking accident

reports, laboratory investigations, and safety policy compliance into account for promotion and
tenure and the allocation of departmental resources. He also suggested that grant funding and
prizes should be denied to PIs with poor safety records. Although these ideas have been taken up
by other commentators,92 so far these recommendations have not been implemented. We are not
aware of any PIs who have been terminated or denied funding because of a poor safety record, so
these policy recommendations have not appeared to have any influence to date.
A call for action
The state of academic safety research is unconscionable and cannot be allowed to continue. Data
is required to develop evidence-based policies to address each of the issues we have raised in this
article. Currently, there is no central database or organization responsible or funded to collect and
analyze the annual number and characteristics of accidents in academic research labs. Data is
needed not only on the headline-grabbing accidents that result in fatalities or hospitalizations, but
on any close-calls, regardless of the occurrence of injury or significant property damage as the
differences between near-misses and major catastrophes may be primarily due to good luck rather
than good management. We need to know how big of a problem underreporting of accidents is and
what factors are associated with underreporting. Data of this type would enable the identification
of variables associated with accident frequency and severity and would help to determine the most
appropriate countermeasures.
We need more information about the causes of academic lab accidents. We need to know how,
where, when and to whom accidents happen. We need to know what contributes to accidents at
the level of the individual, the lab, the department and the institution. We need to know the impact
of these accidents on the victim, their friends and family members, their labmates, fellow students,
faculty and staff, and the wider academic culture and institutional community. Do students drop
out? Do they change their career plans? Are there mental-health repercussions for students,
labmates, faculty members, staff members or other members of the university and research
community? Is the climate different in universities where there have been multiple incidents? We
have none of this information.
We need to delve further into attitudes and beliefs about safety. We need to know how these are
correlated with demographic variables, training and lab experiences. We need to know how safety
attitudes develop and how and when to intervene such that students view safety as a fundamental
priority within science rather than a hassle. We need to know how beliefs and attitudes relate to
behavioural practices with regards to PPE usage and risk assessment and how best to address
discrepancies to keep personnel safe.
We need more research into safety training. There are two key domains of inquiry here. The first
focuses on process: How is training currently done at different institutions? Are there more
effective strategies for conveying the content? How should comprehension be evaluated? Under
what circumstances is information retained? The second focuses on content: What should the
content include? How should new situations be evaluated for safety? Most importantly, both
strands of the research need to converge on the most important question: how do training
interventions correlate with frequency and severity of accidents in labs?

However, while actuarial data and guidance in training procedures would be of great benefit, it
will not necessarily help address the fundamental problem of culture, that is, the 'fiefdoms' so
omnipresent in academic settings.100 We need to identify the barriers that prevent the systematic
acceptance of the necessity for the learning and application of safety principles among students,
faculty and staff. We need to understand what interventions, rewards, and sanctions are required
to overcome these barriers. We need to better understand the social scripts around scientific
identity and culture. We need to understand how best to implement meaningful and impactful
safety training starting in first year undergraduate level (or earlier) and how to build upon it
continually throughout the degree and into graduate and postdoctoral training and faculty
mentoring. We need to use proper methodology to determine the effectiveness of the training
methodology and look at quantifiable outcomes. We need to determine how to address inherent
challenges to safety research and training in the academic setting, such as high turnover of staff
and students.57
Conclusions
Currently, there are 45 universities in Canada offering graduate chemistry programs with a total
of approximately 880 research groups in chemistry departments based on a hand count conducted
on December 29, 2018.There are 432 R1, R2 and R3 universities in the United States; although a
count of research groups would be challenging, we would expect around 10,000 research groups.
As graduate education spreads around the world, and with the exponential growth of programs in
China and India, the number of individuals involved in academic chemical research is set to
expand. Currently, we are operating completely in the dark with regards to safety policies in both
training and practice. We do not even know how many people are hurt every year and how badly,
nor how great the damages are to laboratories, buildings and equipment. We simply have no idea
about the scale of the issue — on the very day this section of the article was written, three graduate
students were killed in a research-lab explosion at Beijing Jiaotong University,9 and while the
article was under review, another accident occurred at UCLA that involved a brief
hospitalization.101
The benefits of establishing academic lab safety research programs would be substantial.
Ultimately, the goal would be to decrease the rate and severity of accidents in academic labs,
ensure that lab personnel stay safe and healthy, and that equipment, laboratory and buildings are
protected. This is also likely to have a spillover effect into industry — better-trained, more safetyconscious students would make better industrial employees. Undoubtedly, there would be financial
savings related to the cost of accidents, insurance rates and lawsuits.
Despite calls for safety studies to form a central part of chemical research including tenure-track
positions at major research universities,64 and an increased understanding and interest in chemical
safety studies by experimental research professors,15 we could not identify any scientist whose
principle mandate was the study of chemical safety. At present, we know of no tenure-track
positions in science safety at any global research university. Despite the need for these positions,
we are not optimistic that the university community will address this situation, but sincerely hope
to be proven wrong. If action is not taken soon, academic chemical research may come to be seen
as too risky for some institutions from a liability perspective: if we as a discipline do not take
action, action may well be taken for us.

Scientific research, dealing with new methods, new materials, and a constant influx of new and
inexperienced trainees will always be potentially hazardous, but we must do what we can to
manage those risks that can be managed. In 2009, Langerman said, “I have come to the
disheartening conclusion that most academic laboratories are unsafe venues for work or study. I
have concluded that only by a major change in the way we practice laboratory safety can we
improve the situation."98 In his profile of major incidents in research labs, he noted with depressing
repetitiveness that in most cases, virtually-identical incidents occurred at the same institutions
within 10-15 years, resulting in the destruction or temporary closure of the buildings.99 More than
ten years after Sangji’s avoidable and tragic death, we have not made nearly enough progress into
understanding and addressing academic lab safety issues. We hope a ten-year follow-up to this
review will conclude differently.
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Table 1. A partial list of researchers killed in laboratory accidents at academic institutions (20082018), adapted from the Laboratory Safety Institute.14
Year
2018

2018
2015
2015

2014

2012
2011
2009
2008

Institution
Jiaotong
University

Location
Beijing, China

Accident description
3 graduate students (names unknown) killed
during an explosion while researching
wastewater treatment
Indian Institute Bengaluru, India
Manoj Kumar killed in high-pressure
of Science
hydrogen cylinder explosion
Tsinghua
Beijing, China
Meng Xiangjian, postdoctoral fellow, killed in
University
hydrogen explosion
University of Phnom
Penh, Huy Siep killed when flammable gas ignited
Health
Cambodia
Sciences
Texas
A&M Doha, Qatar
Hassan Kamal Hussein killed in explosion in
University at
petroleum lab
Qatar
Unknown
Shanghai, China
Graduate student (name unknown) opened a
university
poison gas cylinder and died from inhalation
Yale University New Haven, USA
Michele Dufault died during a lathe accident
University of Chicago, USA
Malcolm Casadaban died from exposure to
Chicago
plague-related bacterium
UCLA
Los Angeles, USA
Sheri Sangji died from burns caused by
ignition of tert-butyllithium

